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1. INTRODUCTION
A society bears the cost of taxation in the lost value to consumers and
producers of the reduction in employment and sales. The valuation of
this loss, or excess tax burden, provides important information to
society and its policymakers. It gives them a tool with which to
compare the private and public costs and benefits of various tax
measures.
Building on the work of Hicks (1941), Mohring (1971) and Diamond
and McFadden (1971) used the equivalent and compensating
variations, respectively, to provide rigorous definitions of excess tax
burden. More recently, economists have given greater attention to the
marginal excess burden (MEB) of taxes, i.e., to the social cost of
raising an additional dollar of tax revenue. Stuart (1984) and Ballard et
al. (1985) used the equivalent variation to define the MEB as the lump
sum amount that households would be willing to pay to avoid a tax
change. The MEB can be measured in a general equilibrium model by
first calculating the equilibrium economic parameters for a given set of
taxes, then calculating those parameters after the rate of some tax
changes a little. The excess tax burden is the sum of the lump sum
payments required by households to bring them back to their initial
minus the additional revenues generated by the tax. The MEB is equal
to the ratio of the excess tax burden to additional tax revenues.
This definition of the MEB is not completely based on an equilibrium
approach because the reactions of economic agents to the lump sum
payments are not considered. Here, we include additional payments in
equilibrium model as a component of household income. Furthermore
we will use compensating variation.
Let us consider equilibrium in a general equilibrium model with taxes.
Suppose that one of the tax rates changes and each household
receives additional outside income that allows it, in equilibrium, to
preserve its initial utility level. The difference between the sum of
these additional compensating incomes (ACI) and the increment of tax
revenues is called the excess tax burden. Its ratio to the increment is
called the MEB when the tax change is small.
We intend also to change here the procedure of MEB calculation.
Instead of computing two equilibrium states before and after tax
change we are going to consider the second equilibrium as a
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perturbed initial one and to use comparative statics to determine the
MEB.
Our purpose here is to evaluate the MEB for the present Russian tax
system. The available data about Russia's economy do not allow us to
consider detailed equilibrium models such as Ballard's. Nevertheless,
there are data published by Goskomstat about monthly collections of
Russian federal taxes (profit tax, value added tax, personal income tax
and excises) and monthly payroll data that allow us to make estimates.
We develop explicit expressions for the MEB of every one of four
Russian federal taxes (section 2). As might be expected, the profit tax
does not create excess burden (MEB=0). Excess burdens of taxation
of paid and received wages are equal. The excess burden of the value
added tax is equal or less than the latter two. The difference depends
on the concavity of production function. It is zero under constant
returns to scale.
In section 2, we further show that the relationship between MEB
estimates from our approach and that of Diamond, McFadden (1974)
is ambiguous for the general case. In the case of a separable utility
function, the approach of Diamond and McFadden (1974)
underestimates efficiency losses.
In section 3, we calculate the marginal excess tax burden for the
Russian economy in 1996. We calculate MEB for the income tax and
the payroll tax for the general case and the value-added tax in the
case of constant returns to scale. We show that the excess tax burden
changes together with tax levies over the course of the year. On
average, the MEB in 1996 was equal to 0,67, suggesting that the MEB
is much greater in Russia than in other countries (Ballard et al., 1985).
In other words, when government collects an additional tax ruble, it
distorts the distribution of labor and goods to such an extent that
Russia loses an additional 0.67 rubles. It follows from this that to
increase allocative efficiency in the Russian economy, the
government ’s role must be reduced. In section 4, we calculate the
losses causes by Russia ’s pension system. And in section 5, we
consider two examples of the tradeoff of moving specific activities
from the public to the private sector, considering that 1 ruble from the
tax-payer costs more to the society than the private one.
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2. MARGINAL EXCESS BURDEN OF TAXES IN EQUILIBRIUM
MODEL
In this section, we are derive explicit expressions of marginal excess
burden (MEB) for Russia ’s primary taxes: profit tax (PT), value added
tax (VAT), personal income tax (IT) and payroll tax (PRT). We will
consider here an equilibrium model of the economy and define MEB in
connection with this model. Then we will obtain the equilibrium
conditions and, lastly, use comparative statics to derive the MEB for
different taxes.
Let us consider a model of competitive economy of Arrow-Debreu
type (Debreu, 1982). The model includes three agents: a
representative household, a producer and a government. There are
two markets, one for a single product and one for homogenous labor.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the product ’s price is
equal to one.
The household chooses its consumption c and working time l as a
solution to the following problem:
u(c, l)® max s.t. c=(1-t)(wl+D)+n+e0.    (1)
Here u is a utility function that does not depend on public goods,
increases with c and decreases with l. The household real income is
the sum of total wages wl, dividends D, and net transfers n, where w
is wage for an hour of working. Household income is taxed
proportionally at the rate t. We suppose here that endowment e0 is not
taxable. We also assume that for any wage and tax rate, working time
is positive.
The producer maximizes disposable profit (i.e., the profit after all tax
payments). According to “All taxes of Russia ” (1996), the definition of
taxable profit is the difference between revenues (after paying the
VAT) and the costs of production. Costs include PRT. In this section
we restrain ourselves to a one-period model with fixed capital. The
producer solves the following problem:
P(l)=(1-a)[(1-b)F(l)-(1+g)wl]® max,    (2)
where F is a production function. F determines the volume of the net
product or value added when l is working time used. F(0)=0, and F
increases with l. In (2) a is the rate of PT, b is the rate of VAT, g is the
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rate of PRT, (1-b)F(l) are revenues after VAT payments. We consider a
case where the disposable profit is paid to household as dividends
D=P(l d),     (3)
where l d is a solution of (2).
The process of changing tax rates, we presume, takes a lot of time.
We, therefore consider them as fixed in the short run. If its budget is
balanced, government consumption can be found from the next
expression:
g+n=twl s+gwl d+bF(l d)+aP(l d).     (4)
Here ls is the solution to (1), with the right hand terms representing
the budget revenues from IT, PRT, VAT and PT, respectively. In this
section, we assume that transfers n are fixed.
An equilibrium under given tax system t=(a, b, g, t) is a vector
E(t)=(w0, c0, l s, l d, g0) such that (c0, l s ) is a solution of (1), l d is a
solution of (2), g0 satisfies (4) and both markets are cleared
l s = l d = l0,     (5)
c0 + g0 = F(l0) + e0.     (6)
The model (1)-(4) is a special case of social system Debreu (1982,
p.702) and equilibrium exists under standard requirements of
continuousness and concavity. Actually, the existence problem is trivial
in our case because we will employ real economic data and suppose
that economy is in equilibrium.
It is easy to see that if equations (1), (3), (5) hold, then the budget
constraint (4) follows from (6) and vice versa.
If some of the tax rates change, the real wage w and dividends D also
change in equilibrium. Hence the utility level changes. Let us call
additional compensating income (ACI) the change in the endowment
e0 that ensures the utility level does not vary in equilibrium after taxes
change and ACI is added.
Formally, let initial tax rates be t0. Later they change to t. Denote u(c0,
l0) = u0 and add the requirement
u(c,l) = u0     (7)
to the definition of equilibrium, simultaneously looking at the
endowment e as variable. Then ACI=e-e0. The government
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expenditures g also change in the new equilibrium, (g-g0). The value
of (e-e0)-(g-g0) is called the excess burden of the tax change t-t0 for
a given tax system, t0. Marginal excess burden (MEB) is the ratio of
the excess burden to the increment of tax revenue when the tax
change is small or, more precisely, MEB= lim [(e-e0)-(g-g0)]/(g-g0)
when t®t0. Obviously, MEB is a derivative in some direction. It is
useful to stress that MEB is related to a given system of taxes. In the
theory of optimal taxation, on the contrary, government expenditures
are given, and taxes are chosen to maximize utility.
An equilibrium vector satisfying the additional requirement (7) is a
solution of (7) and the next system of equations
wu1(c, l) + u2(c, l) = 0,     (8)
c = w l + D' + n + e,     (9)
D' = h(F(l) - (1 + q)wl),   (10)
F'(l) - (1 + q)w = 0,   (11)
g + c = F(l) + e.   (12)
It follows from the Kuhn-Tucker theorem that any solution of (7) –(12)
is an equilibrium. Here ui, i=1,2 are partial derivatives with respect to
first and second arguments. Accordingly, D'=(1-t)D represents net
dividends, and w=(1-t)w is net real wage,
h= (1 - a)(1 - b), 1 + q = (1+ g)((1 - b)(1 - t))-1.   (13)
It follows from (7) –(12) that only two tax parameters q and h can be
considered instead of four original rates.
Let us assume that functions u and F are twice continuously
differentiable and that there are not other equilibria in the
neighborhood of the one defined by (1)-(6) when tax rates are fixed.
Then we can consider g and e as implicit functions of q and h, and
apply the theory of implicit functions to define derivatives of g and e
with respect to q and h. Writing out the total differentials of the
equations (7)-(12), there are three equations for household:
u1dc + u2dl = 0,   (14)
(wu11 + u21)dc + (wu12 + u22)dl + u1dw = 0,   (15)
dc = ldw + wdl + dD' + de.   (16)
2. Marginal excess burden of taxes in equilibrium model
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Here uij is second derivative of u with respect to arguments i and j, i,j
= 1,2,
dD' = - h((1 + q)ldw + wldq) + (F(l) - (1 + q)wl)dh. (17)
The next equation is related to the producer
F"dl - (1 + q)dw - wdq = 0.  (18)
To get (18), equation (11) was used. The last equation is the market
clearing condition
dg + dc = F'dl + de. (19)
If dq and dh are independent variables and the determinant of system
(14)-(19) is not zero, then (7)–( 12) determines a unique equilibrium
for every q and h in the neighborhood of t0. Let us exclude dc, dl and
dw from the last system of linear equations and express dg and de by
dq and dh. The process of transforming the system (14)-(19) is
described in Appendix I. As a result, we obtain two equations:
(1+hrF")dg=(1+hrF"+qwr/l)de+qwr/l(F(l)-(1+q)wl)dh, (20)
dg=de+qw2r(F"r+1+q)1dq , (21)
where
r= u1[w2u11 + w(u12 + u21) + u22 )-1 (22)
It follows from these equations that the determinant of (14)–(1 9 ) is
distinct from zero if r is nonzero. If u is strictly concave, r < 0.
Let us consider first the case of a linear production function F(l)=fl.
Taxable profit is equal to zero, and dividends are zero too. Besides
F"=0. Let us suppose that (1 + qwr/l) is positive. Hence, from (20)
MEB=de/dg-1=1/(1+qwr/l)-1 (23)
We denote MEB in this case by M. Here additional compensating
income (ACI) per ruble of tax revenue increment does not depend on
which tax rate changes. For an additional ruble collected from the
VAT, IT or PRT, losses will be the same.
Remark 1. The tax system t0 is called optimal if for a given g0 it is
impossible to enlarge u0 by changing of tax rates. Under the additional
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requirement that q is fixed, any tax system is optimal in the case of
constant returns to scale. The next equation is correct
g= q(1+q)-1f l(f/(1+q)),
where l(w) is a solution of (8), (9). If this equation has a unique
solution, then any tax system providing g is optimal.
Now let F be a nonlinear concave function. We begin with PT. If only
the rate of PT changes, dq = 0 , it follows from (21) that MEB(PT) = 0.
The profit tax does not impose distortions. It does not affect the
producer's solution and affects households as a lump sum tax.
If only the rates of either PRT or IT change, then dh = 0 and
MEB(PRT) = MEB(IT) = M i.e., excess losses per additional ruble of
revenue are equal for PRT and IT in linear and nonlinear cases. At last,
as it is shown in Appendix I for VAT
MEB(VAT)=Mn-(l+hrlF"+qwr)-1[F(l)-
(1+q)wl](F"r+1+q)h/(1+q)w , (24)
where Mn = [1 + qwr/l(1 + hrF")]-1 – 1.
It is easy to see that Mn < M, since the subtrahend on the right in (24)
is positive i.e., concavity decreases the magnitude of MEB(VAT).
Thus, MEB(PT) < MEB(VAT) < MEB(IT) = MEB(PRT). Hence, the tax
system can be improved (i.e., the utility level can be increased for
given tax revenues) if either a < 1 and some other rate is positive or b
<1 and g+t>0 and so on. This means that in an optimal tax system,
a=1 (Stiglitz, Dasgupta, 1971).
We have noticed that our definition of excess tax burden and MEB
differs from the one given by Diamond, McFadden (1974). Let us now
derive MEB according to their approach and compare it to the above
in the case of constant returns to scale. According to their definition,
the incremental tax burden equals the additional income that a
household would have to be paid such that their utility level before and
after the tax change remained equal. It is not supposed that economy
is in equilibrium after compensating income is added. Now instead of
(14) –(19), ACI is defined as a solution of the next system of linear
equations:
2. Marginal excess burden of taxes in equilibrium model
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u1ACI + u1dc + u2dl = 0,
(wu11 + u21)dc + (wu12 + u22)dl + u1dw = 0,
dc=ldw +wdl, (25)
fdl - (1 + q)dw - wdq =0,
dg+dc=F'dl.
Without the first equation, this system determines the economy ’s
equilibrium after taxes change. As u1 is marginal utility of income, the
first equation in (25) determines ACI. It follows from (25) that
MEB=1/(1+qwr/l+qwrq)-1, (26)
where q = (wu11 + u22)/u1. The comparison of the two definitions of
marginal excess tax burden shows that, in the general case, their
relationship is ambiguous. However, in the case of separable utility,
Diamond and McFadden ’s (1974) definition yields a smaller value for
thelosses.
Remark 2. The expression MEB, in the linear case, can be written in
another way. Using the invariance of utility property (14), let us notice
that dl/dw = - r, and elasticity E = (w /l) dl/dw. Therefore E is the
elasticity of compensated supply of labor.
It follows from these expressions that
MEB=1/(1-Eq)-1. (27)
As it is well known, efficiency losses increase if the elasticity of
compensated labor supply rises.
Remark 3. Till now, we considered only the case when 1+qwr/l>0.
Theoretically, the opposite cases 1+qwr/l<0 and even 1+hrF"+qwr/l<0
are possible too. If MEB(t) is negative, the government expenditures
and utility level can be enlarged simultaneously. That is, the economy
would be on the downward slope of the Laffer curve. In this case, tax
rates should be decreased.
Remark 4. We will show now that all expressions for MEB received
above are valid for the case of many households when there is only
one type of labor. Let each household i,i = 1,…m, solve the next
problem:
ui(c, l)® max,  s.t. c = (1-t)(wl +Di) + ei0. (28)
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Here Di is dividends that i gets. Denote ci ,li as the solution of (27).
Then, as in Appendix, using equations (14)-(16) for household i we get
dci = wdli, dl = - ri dw, lidw = dDi - dei, (29)
where
ri=u1i(w2u11i+w(u12i+u21i) +u22i)-1
Summarizing these expressions with respect to i, we get formulas
(23)-(24) with r = S ri .
3. CALCULATION OF MEB
In this section we evaluate MEB of Russian tax system on the basis of
the equilibrium model, using expression (23). Thus we obtain MEB of
PRT and IT in the general case and of VAT in the case of constant
returns to scale. To compute MEB we need first to calibrate the
model. Let us suppose that at every period of time the economy is in
equilibrium i.e., the observable data that enter system (8)-(12) must
satisfy it. The system also contains some unobservable parameters.
We need to calculate them with the help of (8)-(12) and some
additional economic data. First of all, we have to know parameter r
i.e., some properties of the utility function. Assume that the utility
function does not change with time. Let us consider the separable
logarithmic function
u(c, l) = lg c + h lg (L - l). (30)
It depends on two unknown parameters h and L. Rewrite system
(8)-(12) for linear production and utility functions (30). Building on
equations (8) and (13), we add in some new items important for
numerical results and obtain
c+s=w +n+b, h/(L-l)=w /c, f=(1+q)w, qw l=g+n+b. (31)
The representative household ’s income includes wages, net social
transfers n (with pension payments), and salary paid from the federal
budget b. It uses its income for consumption c and savings s. As
above, we assume that the government budget is balanced and that
tax levies are the only source of government income. This means that
g+n+b=T, (32)
3. Calculation of MEB
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where T is tax collection without PT. We suppose that the pension
fund is consolidated into the federal budget.
The Central Bank of Russia’s Bulletin of Banking Statistics (BBS)
(1996; 1997a, b) contains information about c, s, n, and data on the
components of T. It also contains information about the numbers of
the economically active population and unemployed, which can serve
as the basis for calculating l. There is no information about b, f, g, w
and q. Let us set b=0. Then the first equation in (31) gives us an
enlarged magnitude for w, which together with the last equation in (31)
gives us the effective value of q. Value of q found by this way differ in
a time and are not connected with rates of taxes by (13). This can be
explained by high rates of tax evasion. We tried to compute L and h
using the ordinary least square method for the sample period of 27
months (01.95 - 03.97) but the linear system for L and h was not well-
posed. If l is working time and L is time for work and leisure (without
sleeping time), we assume that l is approximately equal to 2/3 of L.
Then we can find h as an average of values, satisfying second
equation (31). Hence h is enlarged too. It follows from (22) and the
second equation of (31) that
r=-c(L-l)2[w2(L-l)2 +hc2]-1 =-(L-l)/(1+h)w,qwr/l
=-T(L/l-1)[(h+1)(c+s-n)]-1 (33)
i.e., by neglecting b, MEB becomes closer to zero.
The initial data are represented in Tables 1 and 2. Columns in Table 1
contain the following data:
1) Number of economically active population in M. (Table 2; BBS,
1997a);
2) Number of unemployed calculated by method of ILO in M. (Table
2; BBS, 1997a);
3) Monthly consumption expenses of households, c, in T. (trillion)
rubles (Table 3; BBS, 1997a);
4) Monthly savings of households, s, in T. rubles (Table 3; BBS,
1997a);
5) Monthly transfers n in T. rubles (Table 3; BBS, 1997a).
Rows A, B, C of Table 1 contain data for 1 – 5 above for January
1996, July 1996 and November 1996, respectively.
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Table 1
1 2 3 4 5
A 73.0 6.0 73.4 14.8 12.5
B 73.2 6.5 81.5 27.3 15.5
C 72.6 6.7 84.6 29.8 16.2
The columns of Table 2 contain data for the
1) Profit tax collection in T. rubles (Table 5; BBS, 1997b)
2) Personal income tax collection in T. rubles (Table 5; BBS, 1997b)
3) Value added tax collection in T. rubles (Table 5; BBS, 1997b)
4) Excises in T. rubles (Table 5; BBS, 1997b)
These data are given for the same period as in Table 1.
Table 2.
1 2 3 4
A  5.0  3.4  9.2  0.8
B 53.5 30.1 68.0 17.3
C 82.0 49.1 116.3 41.2
The columns of Table 3 contain calculations for the following:
1) Working time, l, is equal to the difference between the first and
second columns of table 1;
2) Taxes collection without profit tax, T, is equal to sum of 2nd, 3rd
and 4th columns of Table 2 (in our model excises do not differ
from the value added tax);
3) Net real wage of household, c + s – n;
4) Net real wage per employee, w, is equal to (c + s - n)/l;
5) Tax parameter, q, is equal to T/wl.
Table 3.
1 2 3 4 5
A 67.0 13.4 75.7 1.13 0.18
B 66.7 115.4 93.3 1.40 1.24
C 65.9 206.6 98.2 1.49 2.10
If we set L = 100 and estimate the average of h, we get h = 0.56.
3. Calculation of MEB
15
Now we are able to estimate MEB using (33). We get MEB = 0.06 in
January 1996, 0.66 in July 1996, 2.30 in November 1996. The value of
MEB rises during the year because tax payments are too small at the
beginning and rise at the end of the year .
We now estimate MEB on the bais of legal tax rates and (13).
Nominal tax rates are calculated according to the laws of the RF (All
taxes of Russia, (1996)). They are equal to:
Tax on profit, 35%;
Value added tax 10-20% (we consider here 20%);
Excises by factual collection are approximately equal to 0.25 of the
VAT (we added them to VAT);
Income tax rate equals 12-35% (we consider here 12% + 1% in the
pension fund).
The payroll tax is the sum of the following charges:
to pension fund, 28%;
to fund of employment, 1.5%;
to medical insurance, 3.6%;
to social insurance, 5.4%;
to road fund, 1%;
to fund of education, 1%;
to police fund, 4%.
The total charges are equal to 44.5% of the payroll fund.
It follows from (13) that q=1.21 and MEB » 0.67. This magnitude
corresponds closely to the value of MEB found from factual tax
collections in the middle of the year.
We thus conclude that when government collects an additional ruble
of tax revenue, it distorts the distribution of labor and goods such that
society additionally loses about 0.7 ruble. It follows that to increase
the efficiency of economy, it is necessary to reduce the size of the
government.
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4. EXCESS BURDEN OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
Until now, we have considered excess tax burden when additional tax
revenues are spent without affecting household utility. In this section,
we will describe the case when the additional tax revenue is
transferred to households. Our purpose is to evaluate the costs of
income redistribution needed for pension payments. Personal income
and payroll taxes are the major sources of these payments. As it was
demonstrated in section 2, MEB of these taxes is similar in the models
with constant and decreasing returns to scale. So, for simplicity, let us
consider the model (1)-(6) with constant returns to scale. As in
section 2, the initial equilibrium is determined by the system (8), (9)
with D' = 0, (11) and (12). To evaluate the excess tax burden of
redistribution, suppose that either of two tax rates (g or t) change and
the compensating income necessary to maintain a constant level of
utility is added. Additional tax revenues are transferred to households.
Then dg=0, and dn and other parameters of the perturbed equilibrium
are defined by the system:
u1dc+u2dl=0,
(wu11 +u21)dc+(wu12 +u22)dl+u1dw =0,
dc=ldw +wdl+dn+de, (34)
-(1+q)dw -wdq =0,
dc =(1 + q)w dl + de.
In section 2, the losses of society were equal to the difference de -
dg. Here they are equal to de, because dg = 0. This means that MEB
= de/dn, i.e., MEB is equal to ACI per ruble of additional tax revenues.
It follows from (34) that
dc=wdl, dl=rdw, dw =-(dn+de)/l, and qw dl=d,
i.e.,
MEB=-qwr/l(1+qwr/l)-1 (35)
and we have got that MEB is equal for both the cases of wasted and
transferred (to households) tax revenues. Let us now use (35) to
4. Excess burden of income redistribution
17
estimate the costs of Russia ’s pension system. The pension fund now
gets 29% of wages and q was equal to 1.24 in July 1996. The net
wages were (1-t)35.2 T. rubles. Without pensions, q would be equal to
0.95. Obviously, the excess tax burden or costs of the pension system
is integral to MEB. So we have to find MEB and pensions for q = 1.05
and 1.15. They are known for q = 1.24. As far as a change of taxes
does not affect productivity, it does affect net real wage and
employment. The expressions for all equilibrium parameters as a
function of different taxes are given in the Appendix. Results from
these calculations are shown in a Table 4. The columns of the Table
contains the following parameters:
1) Value of q;
2) Net real wage per employee, w (M. rubles. a month);
3) Number of employed (M);
4) Pension (T. rubles.);
5) MEB.
Table 4
1.24  1.40  66.7  9.2  0.67
1.15  1.46  68.3  8.08  0.52
1.05  1.53  69.0  4.25  0.43
0.95  1.61  69.7  0.31  0.36
Thus excess tax burden of taxation for distributive pension payments
is approximately equal to 4.4 trillion rubles. That is, for every ruble of
pension payments, society loses 48 kopecks.
5. MEB IN ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF POLITICAL DECISIONS
We now turn our attention to analyzing the costs and benefits of
“political decisions, ” which in terms of our framework refer to actions
that result in the transformation of property rights. Privatization, the
transfer of public property to private hands, and its opposite,
nationalization, would be two such examples. Costs to the government
are ultimately financed by taxpayers. And any profits that the
government generates can substitute for tax collections from the
private sector. Here, as earlier, we consider the consolidated state
budget without singling out special public funds beyond the state
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budget. And in the cost-benefit analysis of a given project, we take
into account all opportunity costs and benefits.
That is, the excess tax burden must be considered since it measures
the distortion of resource allocation. The costs faced by the private
sector are not the source of thedistortions. Additional costs of 1 ruble
to the private sector reduce public utility by 1 ruble (we ignore
constant coefficient of proportionality). However, 1 ruble of tax
collections lowers public utility by (1+MEB) rubles.
We shall explain the essence and the role of this distinction through
two examples.
Example 1. We consider an enterprise that may be either private or
publicly owned. In either case, its owner is responsible for covering all
costs and possesses full residual claimancy rights. We will say that if it
is a public enterprise, its expenses are equal to 100 conventional
units, and if it is private, they are 95. In the both cases gross income
is 110 units. Which of these property forms is better for society if MEB
equals 0.6? Under private possession, the difference between benefits
and costs (that is, the increment of public utility) is 15 units. Under
public possession, profit equals 10 units. But if these profits of the
public corporation reduce by an equal amount, the tax bill on the
private sector, the increment of public utility will be 16 units. Thus,
from the point of view of society, public ownership is better than
private because it reduces the excess burden of taxation.
Example 2. Should schools be run by the private sector if private
sector costs exceed those in the public sector and the quality of
education is not worse than in the public sector? Let us assume that
the costs to the government of maintaining a public high school is 100
units. Whereas if this school is handed over to private owner, its
expenses would increase to 150 units. Public school education is tax-
payer funded with a marginal cost of zero to students, whereas private
school students must cover all expenses. In equilibrium, the payment
for education will equal its marginal utility. That is, both public and
private schools bring in 150 units of utility increment when the
educational
quality is the same. If utility grows proportionally to the difference
between benefits and costs (and is not affected by concerns of
equity), then private schooling is better than public schooling for
society because its costs of 150 is less than the total cost for public
school, 160, if MEB=0.6.
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6. CONCLUSION
Usually Computational General Equilibrium Models are used for
valuing of the marginal excess burden of taxes in developed countries.
These calculations require extensive amounts of data, the level and
quality of which are not present in economies in transition. The CGEM
method, therefore, would probably not produce any more reliable
results than those produced by the formulas for MEB outlined in this
paper. The concept of marginal excess burden of taxes (MEB) has
been modified here. Our MEB is defined more rigorously in
comparison with earlier definitions, in context of equilibrium
consideration. In addition, the formulas expressing MEB as functions
of an economy ’s parameters are simpler.
Our calculations show that the distortion caused by the tax system in
Russia is too big. The excess burden greatly exceeds that of the US
economy. This means that the Russian government is too big and has
to shrunk. The magnitude of MEB has to be taken into account in
when discussing the costs and benefits of tax changes.
APPENDIX I. SOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM OF LINEAR
EQUATIONS (14)-(19).
Let us exclude dc, dl and dw from this system. It follows from (6) and
(14) that
dc=wdl. (A1)
Substituting (A1) in (15) and denoting
r=u1[w2u11 +w(u12 +u21 +u22 )],-1 (A2)
we get
dl=-rdw (A3)
and then it follows from (16)
dw =-(dD'+de)/l. (A4)
It follows from (19), (A1), (11) and (A3) that
The marginal excess burden of taxes in the Russian transition
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dg=de-qwrdw (A5)
and from (A4)
dg = de(1 + qwr/l) + (qwr/l)dD'.
From (17), (18)
dD' = hlF"dl + [F(l) - (1+ q)wl]dh.
From (19), (11), (A1) we get
3dl = (dg -de)/wq
and finally,
(1+hrF")dg=(1+hrF"+qwr/l)de+qwr/l[F(l)-(1+q)wl]dh (A6)
follows from the three last equations. The formula (A6) is the formula
(20) of the text. The second remaining equation connects de and dg
with dq. It follows from (18), (A3) and (A5) that
dg = de + qw2r(F"r +1 + q)-1dq. (A7)
The formula (A7) is the formula (21) of the text.
If dt is an increment of some original tax, then we can rewrite these
two equations:
MEB=de/dg-1=Mn+A[F(l)-(1+q)wl](dh/dt)(dt/dg), (A8)
where
A=-qwr/(l+hrlF"+qwr) and Mn=[1+qwr/l(1+hrF")]-1-1,
MEB=-qw2r(F"r+1+q)-1(dq/dt)(dt/dg). (A9)
Apply (A8) and (A9) to get MEB for VAT. Obviously, (dh/dt)/ (dq/dt)=-
h/(1+q). Notice, that for other taxes either the numerator or the
denominator is zero. Apply (A8) and (A9) to get MEB. Finding dt/dg
from (A9) and substitute it in (A8):
MEB=Mn+A(F(l)-(1+q)wl)(F"r+1+q)h((1+q)qw2r)-1. (A10)
(A10) is the formula (24) of the text.
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APPENDIX II. SOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM (31)
FOR DIFFERENT q.
Suppose that the solution for basic q* is known and changes in tax
rates do not affect productivity f, savings s and government
expenditures without pensions. From f=(1+q)w, we get
w(q)=(1+q)-1(1+q*)w*, (A11)
where * corresponds to basic magnitudes. Let n=m+p, where p is
pension, and m is other transfers. As g+m does not change with
taxes, g+m=q*w*l*-p*. So p=p*+qwl-q*w*l*. It follows from the second
equation (31) that c=(wL-l)/h and from the fourth that (wL-l)/h+s*-n*-
qwl+q*w*l*=wl. Then
l(q)=(wL/h+s*-n*+q*w*l*)(w/h+w*+q*w*)-1. (A12)
It follows from (33) that -qwr/l=q(L/l-1)(1+h)-1, so we can now
calculate MEB and pension as a function of q.
The marginal excess burden of taxes in the Russian transition
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